Strait of Hormuz Crisis: Three Pathways Emerge as Global Energy Market Faces Unprecedented Disruption

The ongoing conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran has propelled the Strait of Hormuz to the forefront of a complex geopolitical crisis. Since hostilities commenced in late February 2026, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has repeatedly threatened or targeted vessels, leading to significant suspensions of transit through the vital waterway. This disruption has been characterized by the International Energy Agency as the most acute supply crisis in the history of the global energy market. In this escalating situation, three distinct scenarios for future developments have been identified: unilateral regional military action, a joint international operation led by the US, and a period of sustained coercive bargaining by Iran.

Scenario One: Unilateral Regional Military Action

This scenario envisions a coalition of regional states, primarily Gulf Cooperation Council members and Jordan, undertaking independent military operations to reopen the Strait of Hormuz without direct US operational involvement. Such action could be driven by severe and prolonged economic strain, the exhaustion of diplomatic avenues, or domestic political pressure to demonstrate state agency and resolve.

However, this approach faces significant challenges, notably "capability asymmetry." While Gulf states have invested substantially in military modernization, they reportedly lack the integrated naval power projection, mine countermeasure capacity, and anti-air defense capabilities required to neutralize the layered asymmetric threats Iran poses in the strait. The stability of such a military coalition is also questionable, with individual states potentially incentivized to free-ride on others' contributions, particularly given the high risks of Iranian retaliatory strikes on their energy infrastructure. Pakistan has consistently cautioned against military escalation and sought to preserve diplomatic space to prevent this scenario.

Scenario Two: Regional Alignment with US Operation

A second scenario posits regional states formally aligning with the United States in a coordinated coercive military campaign aimed at restoring freedom of navigation, under full US operational leadership. In this configuration, Gulf states would allow the US military to utilize their bases and provide political cover, alongside supplementary military assets. Other international partners may also join the effort. This scenario aligns with established frameworks of coercive diplomacy, where limited force is applied to compel behavioral change without triggering an all-out war.

Iran's counterproposal, sent in response to the US 15-point plan for negotiations, signals a bargaining posture rather than outright resistance, suggesting that conditions for successful coercive diplomacy, such as the adversary's perception of disproportionate costs and an available face-saving off-ramp, may not be entirely absent. Nonetheless, Israel's publicly stated opposition to a negotiated settlement and its concerns that US engagement with Iran through intermediaries could undermine its strategic objectives might create internal tensions within the coalition, potentially weakening its credible capability. In this scenario, Pakistan's role would shift from an active mediator to a crucial diplomatic buffer, striving to preserve communication channels between Tehran and Washington even amid open hostilities, an indispensable backchannel within this militarized context.

Scenario Three: Sustained Closure and Coercive Bargaining

The third and most analytically plausible near-term scenario envisions Iran maintaining its grip on the strait, using the ongoing threat of sustained closure as leverage in negotiations with the US. This represents a classic instance of "coercive bargaining"—the manipulation of shared risk to extract political concessions without committing to an all-out confrontation. Iran's selective de-escalation gesture on March 26, permitting vessels from China, Russia, India, Iraq, and Pakistan to transit the strait, is consistent with this strategy.

By differentiating between states based on their political alignment, Tehran simultaneously demonstrates its continued capacity to control access, rewards aligned states, and signals to Washington that a full reopening remains contingent on political accommodation. This constitutes a "limited probe"—a reversible concession designed to test adversary resolve without surrendering fundamental leverage. Iran's counteroffer, including demands for reparations and sovereignty over the strait, represents an extreme starting position from which concessions can be made while maintaining the appearance of firmness. This is the scenario in which Pakistan's mediatory function is most consequential, as the negotiations format under discussion in Islamabad represents precisely the kind of face-saving, high-level but indirect engagement that extended coercive bargaining requires.

Olley News Insight: Pakistan's unique diplomatic position, maintaining channels with both Washington and Tehran, is proving indispensable. Its ability to act as a backchannel is seen as a fragile but critical component in de-escalating the Strait of Hormuz crisis and fostering conditions for a negotiated settlement, even as military pressures mount.

Key Takeaways

  • The Strait of Hormuz crisis, ongoing since February 2026, has led to the most acute global energy supply disruption in history.
  • Three primary scenarios for resolution include unilateral regional military action, a US-led international operation, and sustained coercive bargaining by Iran.
  • Unilateral regional military action is hampered by capability gaps and significant escalation risks for Gulf states.
  • A US-led operation could leverage coercive diplomacy but may face internal tensions due to Israeli opposition to negotiated settlements.
  • The most probable near-term scenario involves Iran using the strait closure as bargaining leverage while indirect negotiations continue.
  • Pakistan's mediatory role is crucial across all scenarios, particularly in facilitating indirect, face-saving negotiations.
  • A sustainable resolution is likely to involve linking partial sanctions relief to incremental strait reopening, reinforced by a multilateral navigation framework under UN supervision.

The three scenarios examined here are not mutually exclusive pathways but rather represent competing pressures operating simultaneously within the same crisis environment. The near-term trajectory will be shaped by the intricate interaction between military capability, coercive signaling, and the structural availability of diplomatic off-ramps. Of the three, the third scenario, where Iran uses the closure of the strait as a sustained bargaining instrument while indirect negotiations continue, represents the most probable configuration, provided Pakistan's mediatory channel remains intact and the US-Israeli alliance does not fracture in ways that either end or radically accelerate military escalation. Scenarios one and two remain contingent on the failure of diplomacy, and both entail disproportionate escalatory risks relative to the anticipated gains. This crisis is not reducible to a binary choice between war and peace; it is a structured bargaining contest in which the conditions for a negotiated outcome – mutual vulnerability, available intermediaries, and face-saving mechanisms – are present but fragile. The preservation of Pakistan's mediatory role, the de-escalatory posture of Gulf states, and the gradual narrowing of the bargaining gap between Washington and Tehran constitute the most realistic foundation for a sustainable, if partial, resolution.